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Infectious diseases affect people, domestic animals and wildlife alike, with
many pathogens being able to infect multiple species. Fifty years ago, fol-
lowing the wide-scale manufacture and use of antibiotics and vaccines, it
seemed that the battle against infections was being won for the human
population. Since then, however, and in addition to increasing antimicrobial
resistance among bacterial pathogens, there has been an increase in the
emergence of, mostly viral, zoonotic diseases from wildlife, sometimes caus-
ing fatal outbreaks of epidemic proportions. Concurrently, infectious disease
has been identified as an increasing threat to wildlife conservation. A syn-
thesis published in 2000 showed common anthropogenic drivers of
disease threats to biodiversity and human health, including encroachment
and destruction of wildlife habitat and the human-assisted spread of patho-
gens. Almost two decades later, the situation has not changed and, despite
improved knowledge of the underlying causes, little has been done at the
policy level to address these threats. For the sake of public health and well-
being, human-kind needs to work better to conserve nature and preserve the
ecosystem services, including disease regulation, that biodiversity provides
while also understanding and mitigating activities which lead to disease
emergence. We consider that holistic, One Health approaches to the manage-
ment and mitigation of the risks of emerging infectious diseases have the
greatest chance of success.
This article is part of the themed issue ‘One Health for a changing world:
zoonoses, ecosystems and human well-being’.1. Introduction
By the 1970s, the human burden of infectious diseases in the developed world
was substantially diminished from historical levels, largely due to improved
sanitation and the development of effective vaccines and antimicrobial drugs
[1]. The emergence of a series of novel diseases in the 1970s and 1980s
(e.g. toxic shock syndrome, Legionnaire’s disease), culminating with the
global spread of HIV/AIDS, however, led to infectious disease rising back up
the health policy and political agendas [2]. Public concern about emerging
infectious diseases (EIDs) has been heightened because of the perception that
infectious diseases were previously under control, because of their often
rapid spread (e.g. severe acute respiratory syndrome; SARS), because they
often have high case fatality rates (e.g. Ebola virus disease) and because the
development of drugs and vaccines to combat some of these (e.g. HIV/AIDS)
has been slow and costly. By the 1990s, authors had begun to review similarities
among these diseases and identify patterns in their origins and emergence [3,4].
Similarities included a skew to zoonotic pathogens originating in wildlife in
tropical regions (e.g. Ebola virus), and that emergence was associated with
environmental or human behavioural change and human interaction with
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to be exacerbated by increasing volumes and rates of human
travel and globalized trade [8].
By the end of the 1990s, the study of EIDs was a staple of
most schools of public health, a key focus of national health
agencies, a book topic and the title of a scientific journal [3].
Novel diseases continued to emerge, often from unexpected
reservoirs and via new pathways. For example, between
1994 and 1998, three new zoonotic viruses (Hendra, Menangle
and Nipah viruses) emerged from pteropodid bats in Austra-
lia and southeast Asia [9]. Each of these was transmitted
via livestock (horses or pigs), and each belonged to the
Paramyxoviridae. Around this time, emerging diseases were
identified in a series of well-reported die-offs in wildlife,
including canine distemper in African lions (Panthera leo) in
the Serengeti, chytridiomycosis in amphibians globally, pil-
chard herpesvirus disease in Australasia and West Nile virus
in corvids and other birds in New York [10–13]. Pathogens
were also implicated for the first time in species extinctions,
or near-extinctions, e.g. canine distemper in the black-footed
ferret (Mustela nigripes), chytridiomycosis in the sharp-
snouted day frog (Taudactylus acutirostris) and steinhausiosis
in the Polynesian tree snail, Partula turgida [14–16]. Novel dis-
eases and their emergence in people and wildlife were
reviewed, and commonalities in the underlying causes of
emergence discussed, in a paper published at the end of the
decade [17]. Here, we re-examine some of the key conclusions
of that paper, review how the field has progressed 17 years on
and identify some of the remaining challenges to understand-
ing and mitigating the impacts of disease emergence in and
from wildlife.12. Disease threats to wildlife
Prior to 2000, wildlife diseases weremostly studied to improve
zoo animal survival and welfare, with little published on the
diseases of free-living wildlife unless they affected heavily
hunted species (e.g. deer in North America) or were con-
sidered a threat to livestock health (e.g. tuberculosis,
rinderpest). While non-infectious diseases had been widely
recognized as important drivers of species declines (e.g.
DDT poisoning of raptors [18,19]), only a small number of
researchers investigated infectious disease as a factor in,
often covert, wildlife population regulation [20,21]. The role
of infectious diseases in mass mortality events or population
declines was often considered controversial or secondary to
other factors [22], and their role in species extinctions often dis-
puted [23,24]. The first definitive identification of disease as a
cause of species extinctionwas published in 1996 following the
demise of the last population of the Polynesian tree snail P. tur-
gida due to a microsporidian infection [16]. This added to
evidence that infectious agents had caused the extinction in
the wild of the black-footed ferret, the extinction of around
one-third of Hawaiian honeycreepers and the slime mould-
induced decline of eelgrass (Zostera marina) beds in the USA,
leading to extinction of the eelgrass limpet (Lottia alveus)
[14,25–27]. During the 1990s, wildlife mortality events
caused by infectious diseaseswere reported in zoos, inwildlife
translocation programmes and in other conservation pro-
grammes [28–32]. Perhaps the most important of these was
the discovery of amphibian chytridiomycosis, caused by the
chytrid fungal pathogen Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis,which was first recognized in the 1990s and has since been
implicated in the decline or extinction of over 200 species of
amphibian [11,15,33,34]. This disease continues to threaten
amphibians globally and has been described as ‘the worst
infectious disease ever recorded among vertebrates in terms
of the number of species impacted, and its propensity to
drive them to extinction’ [35].
Amphibian chytridiomycosis appears to have emerged
contemporaneously in Australia and Central America, associ-
ated with large-scale die-offs and extinction events, although
in retrospect it might have been causing amphibian mortal-
ities and declines in North America prior to this [36].
Proving that a disease is a cause of population declines in
wildlife requires longitudinal population and pathogen
data, which are often very difficult to collect. Thus, a series
of papers disputing the role of chytridiomycosis in amphi-
bian declines ensued, with most suggesting that this disease
either emerged secondarily to other factors, or that it was
not the cause of declines/extinctions [37–40]. Long-term
datasets have since been published which provide convincing
evidence that amphibian chytridiomycosis alone can cause
mass mortalities leading to population declines [41]. Policy
measures to control amphibian chytridiomycosis, however,
have been slow to be enacted, with the first international
policy measure (listing of chytridiomycosis by the World
Organisation for Animal Health) occurring in 2010 [42] and
with the implementation of measures recognized to mitigate
the spread of this disease still not being enacted by the
international community [43].
Public and political reaction to the more-recent emergence
of white nose syndrome (WNS) in North American bats pro-
vides evidence that the conservation implications of wildlife
EIDs are becoming more widely accepted. The causative
agent of WNS is the fungus Pseudogymnoascus destructans
which colonizes the skin of a range of temperate-zone bats,
often causing death during hibernation [44]. Only 1 year
after the initial discovery of the disease in the USA in January
2007, visitors to bat caves across the country were being
advised to reduce visits and to implement biosecurity
measures, and by 2009, caves in over 20 states were closed
to the public. The disease has been the focus of a series of
grants, formation of multi-disciplinary research partnerships
and significant efforts to identify pathogenesis, transmission
pathways and potential control measures [45,46].
Although there is a growing recognition of the impact of
pathogens on wildlife, the significance of infectious disease
as a cause of historical extinctions is likely underestimated
due to a previous relative lack of infectious disease focus and
diagnostic capability [47]. Collaboration among ecologists,
conservation biologists and veterinary pathologists is rela-
tively recent and increased pathological and epidemiological
involvement in studies of the causes ofwildlife declines are cri-
tically needed to identify and understand disease threats to
wildlife and how to mitigate them.3. Zoonotic disease emergence from wildlife
In addition to identifying an apparently growing trend of dis-
ease threats to wildlife, Daszak et al. [17] highlighted wildlife
as the source of a series of high-impact, recently emerging
pathogens affecting people. These authors reiterated the
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range of ecological, demographic and socio-economic
changes [1,3,48]. Prior to 2000, these wildlife-origin patho-
gens were known to include Ebola and Marburg virus,
HIV-1 and HIV-2, Sin Nombre virus, Nipah, Hendra and
Menangle virus, West Nile virus, Borrelia burgdorferi and
others. Since then, other human diseases have emerged
from wildlife, including Middle East respiratory syndrome
(MERS) and different subtypes of avian influenza, and
further advances have been made in our understanding of
patterns of zoonotic disease emergence. A series of papers
analysed a database of all known human EIDs and confirmed
that the majority are of animal origin, with viruses being a
particularly important group [49–52]. Further analysis of an
updated version of this database identified that EIDs had
increased in frequency (even accounting for increased num-
bers of researchers), with the proportion of those emerging
from wildlife hosts increasing substantially over the last
four decades of the twentieth century [53].
The emergence of bat-origin viral EIDs of people during
the 1990s was highlighted by Daszak et al. [17]. Since then, it
has been shown that bats are reservoir hosts of a striking
number of zoonotic viruses, including high-profile pathogens
with high case fatality rates, such as Nipah and Hendra para-
myxoviruses, filoviruses, SARS-like coronaviruses and
possibly alsoMERS coronavirus [54,55]. This led some authors
to propose that bats harbour a disproportionate number of
emerging zoonoses compared with other mammalian groups
[55–57]: a hypothesis that has been supported by two separate
analyses of mammal virus datasets [58,59]. Understanding
why bats host so many zoonotic pathogens that cause lethal
diseases in humans and how spillover from bats to humans
occurs is important in order to control these, and possibly
as-yet-undiscovered, diseases [58,60–63].4. Drivers of disease emergence
There are likely to be multiple causes of novel disease emer-
gence, but the human-mediated transport of pathogens (often
in infected hosts) or vectors across geographical or ecological
boundaries, a process termed ‘pathogen pollution’, has been
identified as a major driver of this in wildlife [64] and also in
plants [65]. The anthropogenic spread of pathogens has been
responsible for the emergence of a series of high-profile wild-
life EIDs, including the two known agents of amphibian
chytridiomycosis, B. dendrobatidis and B. salamandrivorans
[66,67]. Subsequent research indicates that this is only part
of the story, as it appears that the global pandemic lineage
of B. dendrobatidis arose from a single hybrid origin via an
ancestral meiosis, possibly via the anthropogenic mixing of
allopatric lineages [68,69]. There is a substantial volume of
research that shows how, once evolved, this virulent lineage
has been introduced globally via the international trade
in amphibians and via the human-assisted introduction of
invasive species [66,70–75].
In recent years, a body of literature has developed the
concept of the ecosystem service of disease regulation.
While still controversial, and probably not universal [76],
this proposes that natural biodiversity limits the exposure
and impact of many pathogens, including those that are zoo-
notic, through a dilution or buffering effect, thus limiting
opportunities for pathogen spillover from wildlife to people[77]. When biodiversity is depleted (usually by human activi-
ties), this ecosystem service is impaired and zoonotic
pathogens are more likely to emerge, as has been shown
for hantavirus [78] and for B. burgdorferi, the causative
agent of Lyme disease [79,80]. Also, alteration of species
complements (again, usually due to anthropogenic impacts),
rather than loss of biodiversity per se, can alter infection
dynamics and lead to increased zoonotic disease risk [81].
Our understanding of the interactions between ecosystem
change, disease regulation and human well-being, however,
is in its infancy.
Almost 20 years since the threats to conservation and
human health that wildlife EIDs represent was first high-
lighted, there has been little effort to put in place policies to
reduce risk. Detecting and preventing the importation of
infected hosts is widely used to prevent importation of many
domestic animal diseases of economic or public health impor-
tance. Some countries even enact this principle for the
movement of people, whereby they conduct (often cursory)
surveillance for infected persons arriving at their international
borders, particularly during human pandemics [82,83]. The
World Health Organisation provides guidance and training
on this through its International Health Regulations (http://
www.who.int/ihr/en/). Rules and regulations for inter-
national trade, including of animals and their products, are
created and enforced by the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), which has the remit of ensuring ‘that trade flows as
smoothly, predictably and freely as possible’ (www.wto.
org). The WTO agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary
measures was enacted on 1 January 1995 with the aim of pro-
tecting human, animal and plant life from disease-causing
agents. While countries have discretion in what should be
included, they are guided by the World Organisation for
Animal Health (OIE) list of diseases of international impor-
tance. Although the OIE has a remit of protecting
biodiversity, only two pathogens are listed for this purpose:
B. dendrobatidis and Ranavirus [42]. Most countries, therefore,
use import controls to only protect against domestic animal
diseases of obvious public health or economic importance,
such as rabies and foot and mouth disease; diseases restricted
to wildlife are not included even when OIE-listed.
In addition, trade agreements often prohibit barriers to
international animal movements for the purposes of infec-
tious disease control. For example, countries within the
European Union have little ability to prevent the spread of
pathogens via within-EU trade unless as part of a specific
EU disease control programme. Even where technically
legal under WTO rules, there appears to be reluctance by
countries to unilaterally impose restrictions on non-listed dis-
eases in case they create an economic disadvantage or are
subsequently found to be in breach of international trade
regulations. It is possible that the international spread of
amphibian chytridiomycosis would have been reduced if
such measures had been implemented for this disease [43].
Perhaps learning from this, in January 2016, the USA
banned the importation of salamanders following the emer-
gence of B. salamandrivorans in order to protect native
wildlife from this novel pathogen [84]. Such protective
action was enacted relatively rapidly following the discovery
of B. salamandrivorans as a novel lethal fungus infecting and
killing captive and wild salamanders in Europe [67,85,86].
Hopefully, this will open the doors to the imposition of
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of pathogens.
Challenges remain to understanding the wildlife origins
of zoonotic EIDs. It is often difficult, time-consuming, logisti-
cally challenging and very expensive to identify the origins of
newly emerged pathogens of humans. For example, viruses
similar to HIV/AIDs were discovered in non-human pri-
mates in the early 1980s, but identification of the true
progenitor viruses in chimpanzees took almost a decade of
additional research [87]. Similarly, the origins of Ebola and
Marburg viruses have been investigated for over 30 years.
To date, however, despite indications that bats are the natural
reservoir hosts of these viruses, clear evidence has only been
found for Marburg virus infection in bats in limited locations
[88–90]. Identifying putative reservoir host(s) is just the
beginning. In order to identify actions to prevent or mitigate
future zoonotic spillover, both an understanding of the ecol-
ogy of the pathogen in its natural host(s) and of human–host
interactions are required [63]. For example, substantial efforts
have been conducted to understand immunological, behav-
ioural and ecological characteristics of bats as part of a
strategy to control zoonotic spillover from bats [91–93].
Long-term, multi-disciplinary studies that systematically
investigate the ecology of zoonotic pathogens in their wildlife
hosts along with the risk characteristics for spillover are criti-
cal to better predict and prevent future pandemics [63]. Such
a study, which included years of field data collection on fruit
tree distribution, pig farm management, viral dynamics and
satellite telemetry of fruit bats, analysis of climate trends,
experimental infection of bats under BioSafety Level-4 con-
ditions and mathematical modelling of virus infection
dynamics, identified the intensification of the pig industry
as the driver of the zoonotic emergence of Nipah virus in
Malaysia [94]. These results informed government policies
to separate pigs from bats via the removal of fruit trees
from pig farms and the relocation of farms away from
forested areas [95], since when no further Nipah virus disease
outbreaks have occurred in Malaysia.5. Endemic zoonoses from wildlife
EID events have been the focus of intense research over the
past two decades, even though the numbers of people diag-
nosed with them are often relatively small. This
disproportionate focus on EIDs probably relates to the dislike
of human society for uncertainty, or put more simply, fear of
the unknown. This may lead to perverse scenarios in which
fear of disease can have a greater impact than the direct
impact of the outbreak itself. For example, during a recent
Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa, more people are esti-
mated to have died from malaria due to their avoidance of
healthcare facilities, where they feared they might catch
Ebola, than the thousands that died from the virus itself [96].
Indeed, when one considers the overall impact of zoono-
tic diseases on the human population, the largest (diagnosed)
burden is associated with well known and fully recognized
(in the industrial north), but neglected, diseases such as bru-
cellosis, rickettsioses and Rift Valley fever [97]. This
predictable burden falls heavily on the global poor—poverty
being the major risk factor for most zoonoses, which in turn
causes some communities to suffer disproportionately from
the burden of zoonotic disease [97]. The neglect of suchdiseases includes diagnostic neglect (and confusion with
other conditions such as malaria [98]) and historic and cur-
rent research neglect; all of which feeds into therapeutic
neglect. The delivery of the United Nations sustainable
development goals, which should result in much reduced
poverty and improved health, will in themselves reduce the
substantial burden of zoonotic disease.6. Whither One Health
One Health is the term used when approaches to tackling dis-
ease (particularly zoonoses) consider all components that
might lead to, or increase, the threat of disease. These include
environmental and ecological/wildlife components as well as
domestic animal and human factors. The last encompasses be-
havioural as well as medical issues, including cultural,
political and other socio-economic drivers that might result
in disease occurrence or spread. The review by Daszak et al.
[17] was perhaps the first ‘OneHealth’ review of emerging dis-
eases, in that it brought together veterinary, ecological,
conservation and human medical perspectives on disease
emergence. The field of One Health has expanded substan-
tially since 2000, diversifying to produce new journals, such
as One Health, EcoHealth and The Lancet Planetary Health, the
One Health Platform, the International Association of Ecology
and Health, the Planetary Health Alliance and a series of
One Health institutions in the USA, Europe, Australia and
increasingly also in developing countries. The success of
this multi-disciplinary approach has been driven largely by
the synergistic impact of combining detailed and logistically
challenging field sciences (e.g. ecology, field biology) with
analytical approaches (e.g. epidemiological modelling,
pathogen phylogenetic analysis) and laboratory science (e.g.
serology, pathogen diagnostics, immunology). Challenges
remain, however. Importantly, while the conservation, eco-
logical and veterinary professions are increasingly engaged
with One Health, substantial elements of the medical
profession are not aware of, or involved in, this approach.
Despite their neglect, a number of zoonotic diseases are
eminently controllable or manageable by One Health
approaches, including infectious causes of abortion in live-
stock, which frequently result in febrile human disease, and
human rabies transmitted via dog bites. Control or preven-
tion is best achieved through integrated public health,
veterinary medicine, animal management and ecological
approaches. One particular challenge for this is in the case
of some zoonotic infections that do not cause clinical signs
in their animal hosts, one of the most common examples of
which is Campylobacter spp. infection of poultry, which glob-
ally is the most frequent cause of food poisoning in humans
[99]. Is it, then, the responsibility of farmers and vets to
ensure that people do not become infected, or of public
health practitioners or the general public through improved
kitchen hygiene and behaviours? Here, this would involve
reduced infection of poultry (the role of farmers and veteri-
narians), reduced contamination of meat (the responsibility
of veterinary public health workers) and preventive measures
in the kitchen (hygiene and proper cooking), which are the
domain of public health workers and the public [99].
One Health approaches are required at the policy and
governance levels, too. Responsibility for preventing
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government Ministries of Health and Agriculture (and for
wildlife, Ministries of Environment and Forestry) and this
can structurally prevent the simplest of solutions from
being implemented. An important example is rabies in
humans transmitted through dog bites which kills around
60 000 people annually [100] and causes fear in many more
in rabies endemic regions. The disease is easily preventable
(and arguably open to eradication) through repeated annual
or biannual mass vaccination of dogs [101]. In many
countries with a high burden of rabies in dogs, considerable
sums are spent by the public and Ministries of Health
annually on post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP—often given
after dog bites whether or not the animal was known to be
rabid). The expense of this repeated treatment usually dic-
tates that far more is spent on treatment than would be
required to vaccinate all dogs in the same region. However,
in many countries, the dog is regarded as a pest and not an
agricultural animal for which Ministries of Agriculture have
responsibility. In others, the dog does fall under the Agricul-
tural Ministry, but these Ministries are typically far less well
resourced compared with Ministries of Health, thus rabies,
which does not relate to food animals, is not prioritized.
The obvious solution is for a synergized One Health
approach with the Ministries of Health supporting prophy-
lactic vaccination programmes for dogs delivered by their
typically far less well-resourced Ministries of Agriculture.
This, however, rarely seems to happen and continued expen-
diture on bite management and PEP continues. One Health
programmes addressing rabies have been extremely success-
ful when appropriately resourced [102,103]; however, they
often fail to influence national government policy and are
rarely adopted long term [104].7. Policies for prevention and control
In addition to the high costs of dealing with endemic zoo-
noses, such as rabies, emerging and re-emerging zoonoses
can have substantial economic impacts. The cost implications
of zoonotic EIDs were highlighted by Daszak et al. [17] as a
rationale for policy measures, but methods for calculating
the economic consequences of disease emergence have not
advanced in the interim. Despite clearly high financial
impacts associated with some EIDs, few detailed economic
analyses of their impact have been undertaken. Estimates of
the cost of the 2003 SARS outbreak, for example, range
from $5 to $50 billion, while the true costs of most EIDs
have never been estimated [105]. Pike et al. [105] approached
the problem of disease emergence in the same way as the cli-
mate change phenomenon. They used the increasing
frequency of emerging disease events reported by Jones
et al. [53] to analyse two strategies to deal with the rising
costs of EIDs over time: adaptation, whereby we adopt a
business-as-usual approach and continue to cause increased
EID events, then target control programmes after emergence;
and mitigation, whereby we deal with the underlying drivers
(e.g. wildlife trade, deforestation) and reduce the frequency of
EID events. Pike et al. [105] show that mitigation strategies are
more cost effective in the long term, with a 10-fold return on
investment, and that these need to be enacted on a global
scale within the current generation or the cost of EIDs
becomes unaffordable.What would these global strategies entail? We highlight
three approaches. First, a series of emerging diseases have
been linked to the wildlife trade, or consumption of wildlife
(e.g. SARS, Ebola). The health implications of the trade in
wildlife have not been widely used to implement controls,
or advocate for reduction in consumption, and may be a
more effective message than its conservation impacts. This
needs to be done judiciously, however, as disease spillover
is a rare event and both bushmeat hunters and consumers
will be wary of public health messages that do not fit with
their experiences [93,106].
Second, a revision of an earlier analysis of global drivers of
disease emergence [53] shows that land-use change correlates
strongly with the emergence of zoonoses from wildlife
(P Daszak 2017, unpublished observation). In Malaysia, ana-
lyses of the economic cost of diseases that emerge due to
land conversion for palm oil production (e.g. malaria, leptos-
pirosis) are currently being used to advise industry where to
reduce long-term impact. Identifying land-use changes
that lead to disease emergence informs policies for mitiga-
tion strategies. This could be done, for example, via the
incorporation of wildlife and zoonotic disease threats in
environmental impact studies, an approach for the prevention
of disease emergence suggested by Daszak et al. [17].
Third, targeted global surveillance programmes to identify
novel pathogens of zoonotic potential before they emerge may
increase our capacity to reduce their risk of emergence. For
example, a series of laboratories now specialize in identifying
novel viruses from wildlife hosts, e.g. bats [107–113]. The
USAID Emerging Pandemic Threats programme specifically
targets emerging disease hotspots to identify novel viruses
from bats, rodents and primates, to characterize high-risk beha-
viours in people and to identify potential mitigation strategies
[60]. While these programmes have already identified over
1000 new viruses from viral families with known zoonoses in
the last few years, challenges remain in how to identify those
with the highest (or any) risk of zoonotic emergence. This indi-
cates that a change in approach is required, building on rapidly
expanding databases of pathogen sequences, phenotypic
characteristics and host–pathogen interactions. For example,
the rapid incorporation of novel viral sequences into diagnostic
tests may lead to more rapid identification of related, pre-
viously unknown, pathogens that emerge in outbreaks. Using
this approach, combined with a One Health perspective that
targets the underlying drivers of emergence, could result in
the identification of pathogens that already are spilling over
from wildlife hosts sporadically at low levels, enabling
measures to be taken to reduce pandemic risk.
8. Conclusion
Since the synthesis paper by Daszak et al. [17] highlighted
emerging disease threats of, and from, wildlife and the
main drivers underlying these, further advances have been
made in our understanding of the origin, size and potential
scope of these threats. Endemic zoonoses, however, continue
to be relatively neglected, often with a lack of local and inter-
national realization of the extent to which they impact human
health and well-being. This is partly due to issues surround-
ing local capacity and knowledge and partly because, unlike
EIDs, they are not seen as a threat to people in the developed
world. Both EIDs and endemic zoonoses, however, can




 on August 23, 2017http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from identification and mitigation of human activities that lead to
disease emergence and spread. One Health approaches to
dealing with disease threats from and to wildlife are still rela-
tively young and untried, but all evidence points to them
being most successful and cost-effective if developed and
implemented in full by all relevant parties, including
policy-makers and the medical profession.
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